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Abstract—Password advice is constantly circulated by stan-
dards agencies, companies, websites and specialists. But there
appears to be great diversity in terms of the advice that is
given. Users have noticed that different websites are enforcing
different restrictions. For example, requiring different combina-
tions of uppercase and lowercase letters, numbers and special
characters. We collected password advice and found that the
advice distributed by one organization can directly contradict
advice given by another. Our paper aims to illuminate interesting
characteristics for a sample of the password advice distributed.
We also create a framework for identifying the costs associated
with implementing password advice. In doing so we identify
a reason for why password advice is often both derided and
ignored.
I. INTRODUCTION
Password advice is important for informing users and or-
ganizations about how to best maintain high standards of
security. However, the content of the advice given is often
not compatible across different sources. Our paper aims to
understand the composition of the advice circulated to users
and organizations and to identify key costs associated with the
implementation of this advice. We collected a large selection
of password advice and categorized it in order to highlight
characteristics and discrepancies. Using the collected advice
we were able to identify costs linked with implementing
the advice. We believe this provides insight into why users
and organizations are not enforcing researcher’s recommended
password practices.
In his 2009 paper, Herley [1] argues that users’ rejection
of security advice is rational from an economic perspective.
Herley identifies advice relating to password security, phishing
and certificate errors. For each, he discussed the costs and
the potential/actual benefits. We will build on Herley’s work
through our creation of a framework for identifying the costs
associated with enforcing password advice.
Despite the wide distribution of advice and the general
acknowledgement of inconsistencies [2], a framework for sim-
ple analysis of advice is not available. Yet, many researchers
have identified problems with the advice given [3]. Inglesant
and Sasse [4] find that users are, in general, concerned with
maintaining security but that existing security policies are
too inflexible to match their capabilities, and the tasks and
This publication has emanated from research supported in part by a research
grant from Science Foundation Ireland (SFI) and is co-funded under the
European Regional Development Fund under Grant Number 13/RC/2077. This
research is also supported by a John and Pat Hume doctoral studentship.
contexts in which they operate. We hope to develop this idea
by identifying some of the demands associated with following
passwords advice. Florêncio, Herley and van Oorschot [5] find
that mandating exclusively strong passwords with no reuse
gives users an effectively impossible task as portfolio size
grows. Bellovin [6] questions whether simple adherence to
password advice on security checklists really accomplishes
the desired security goals. Florêncio, Herley and Coskun ask
"Do strong web passwords accomplish anything?" [7]. They
suggest that strength rules for web passwords accomplish very
little when a lockout rule can restrict access. Beautement et al.
[8] introduce the idea of a compliance budget which formalizes
the understanding that users and organizations do not have
unlimited capacity to follow new instructions and advice. This
is an important concept for us to keep in mind when we look
at the costs of implementing advice.
In this paper, Section II will explain how we collected
the password advice and Section III illustrates the steps we
took for categorizing it. Section IV describes our methods for
identifying costs and how we assigned preliminary costs to a
subset of the advice collected. Lastly, Section V discusses the
characteristics associated with password advice which were
highlighted during this process.
II. COLLECTION OF ADVICE
To begin studying password advice, we first needed to
collect a selection of the advice that is distributed to users.
We primarily used Internet searches to collect password advice
but also looked at advice given by standards agencies and
multinational companies. We attempted to recreate the actions
an individual or organization might take when seeking to
inform themselves about proper password practices. As such,
while the advice given in academic papers might be more
considered, if it was not easily accessible, we did not include
it in our study. In total, we collected 269 pieces of password
advice from 21 different sources. Table I shows the types of
sources from which the advice was gathered.
Table I
BREAK DOWN OF ADVICE SOURCES.
Source Number
Multinational companies 6
Universities 6
Security specialists 5
General articles 4
III. CATEGORIZING ADVICE
To extract meaning from the pieces of advice that we
collected we subdivided the advice into categories. Within
each category we created statements that generalized the
recommendations pertaining to each category.
A. Categorization
Our first step after collecting the advice was to group it
into categories. For this we considered each piece of advice
individually. The first pieces of advice we examined suggested
our starting categories. From there, each piece of advice was
either included in one of our existing categories, expanded
the scope of an existing category or created a new category
to suit it. For example, when approaching a piece of advice
which said "Use a unique password for each of your important
accounts" we created the category Reuse across Accounts.
However, when a second piece of advice stated "Don’t recycle
passwords" we altered the name of the category to be the more
general Password reuse. As an example, in Figure 1 we show
the seventeen pieces of advice which became grouped under
the category Password reuse.
In total, we identified 29 categories shown in Table II. The
categories are listed in two columns; one showing categories
containing advice aimed at users and the second showing
advice aimed primarily towards organizations. Also included
are the number of pieces of advice under each category. In
this paper we only have space to include analysis of four of
these categories. They are shown in italics in Table II.
We collected 155 pieces of advice aimed towards users and
114 pieces aimed towards organizations. Despite its greater
quantity user advice has been subdivided into fewer categories.
We speculate this could be related to the wider variety of
roles an organization plays in the security of passwords. But
it could also reflect our greater familiarity with user advice.
While everyone is a user, not everyone has held all roles in
an organization and therefore it was easier to interpret and
categorize user advice.
B. Classification into statements
Once we divided the advice into categories we noticed the
pieces of advice within each category did not necessarily
promulgate similar opinions. It was therefore necessary to
subdivide the advice into statements which offer a similar
message. In Figure 1 we can see how the seventeen pieces of
advice under Password Reuse were grouped into three distinct
statements:
• Never reuse a password.
• Alter and reuse passwords.
• Don’t reuse certain passwords.
In this figure we make note of pieces of advice that contradict
the main statement with a star (*). It is important to note that
while it appears that there is no contradictory advice within
the category statement "Never reuse a password" the third
statement "Reuse certain passwords" is itself a contradiction.
We make note of this by placing a star (*) in the text box
of the third category. It is also represented by a star in Table
Table II
CATEGORIES AND THE QUANTITY OF ADVICE THEY CONTAIN.
Users # Organisations #
Phrases 37 Expiry 27
Composition 28 Length 17
Personal Information 21 Storage 13
Reuse 17 Keeping system safe 8
Personal pwd storage 17 Throttling guesses 8
Backup pwd options 8 Individual accounts 7
Sharing 14 Generated pwds 6
Keeping account safe 8 Transmitting pwds 2
Password managers 4 Admin accounts 4
Username requirements 2 Default passwords 4
Two step verification 1 Shoulder surfing 3
Two factor authentication 2 Access to pwd file 3
Policies 2
Input 3
Network strings 2
Cracking 1
Back up work 1
Total 159 Total 111
IV. Already we are beginning to see inconsistencies with the
advice that is circulated.
Thus, within each category we created generalized state-
ments of the advice that was given. It is worth noting that the
labels for advice are given from the perspective of the majority.
For example, if two pieces of advice state that passwords
should not include published phrases and one piece of advice
states that it would be a good idea to use published phrases
then the advice will be labeled as "Don’t include published
phrases".
The statements relating to the four chosen categories are
shown on the left hand side of Table IV on page 5. For each
statement the table shows how many pieces of the advice agree
with the sentiment of the statement and how many disagree.
This gives a clear indication of the inconsistencies in circulated
password advice.
IV. IDENTIFICATION OF COSTS
As described in Section III, we categorized the advice
collected into 29 categories and 78 statements. For each state-
ment, we identified the costs we believe are associated with
it. Figure 2 shows an example for the statement "Passwords
must not match account information".
We did not restrict ourselves in the types of costs we
identified. In this way, we were not limiting ourselves by
trying to stay within a predetermined structure. Despite this,
we nearly immediately saw similarities in the costs we were
identifying. After analyzing each of the 78 statements we had
identified 10 categories of costs that we believe provide a
rudimentary understanding of the general costs associated with
obeying password advice. These are shown in Table III.
A. Discussion of cost categories
When determining categories of costs we noticed that some
categories are outcomes of others, similarly, many categories
Password reuse
Category Advice Generalizedstatement
Use a different password
for every website
Don’t use the same password twice
It’s important to use
unique passwords for each
different online account.
Users must not use the same password
for various access needs.
Avoid reusing old passwords.
Don’t recycle passwords.
Incorporate the first few letters
of the website name into your password
so that every password is different.
Add a couple of unique letters
for each site.
Select a single memorable
base password and alter
it to form derivations.
*Users must not use a basic
sequence of characters that
is then partially changed based
on some predictable factor.
*Users are prohibited from constructing
fixed passwords by combining a set of
characters that do not change, with a
set of characters that predictably change.
*Users must not construct passwords
that are identical or substantially
similar to passwords that they
have previously employed.
Use a unique password for
each of your important accounts.
Never use your Apple ID
password with other online accounts.
Must not use the same
password for Company
accounts as for other
non-Company accounts.
Users should never reuse passwords
between work and home.
Passwords used for Internet services
shouldn’t be the same or similar to those
used for services accessed within College.
Never reuse
a password
Alter and
reuse passwords.
*Don’t reuse certain
types of passwords
Figure 1. Method for categorizing advice. Example: Reuse.
Must not match
account information
Increased computing
power for verifier
Inconveniences use
of a personal system
for password
generation
Increases risk of
forgetting
∼ Possible multiple
attempts until a
valid password is
chosen
Organizations’ time
taken to program.
Figure 2. Identifying costs for the statement "Must not match account
information".
Table III
COST CATEGORIES.
Costs
1. Increased risk of forgetting.
2. Need to pick a new password.
3. Possible multiple attempts needed to enter a valid
password.
4. Inconveniences use of a personal system for password
generation.
5. User time taken.
6. Reduced "entropy".
7. Organizations’ time taken to enforce/program.
8. Impossible/hard to enforce.
9. Creates an additional security hole.
10. Increased computing power needed.
can be seen to have "sub-costs". For example, increased risk
of resets is a sub-cost of increased risk of forgetting. Similarly,
abandon site can be seen as a result of Possible multiple
attempts needed to enter a valid password and irritating [9]
can be seen as an outcome of many of the other categories. In
order to minimize this, we reduced the number of categories in
the knowledge that we believe most categories will inevitably
contain sub-costs. Note that we do keep user time as a distinct
category as at times we recognize that there is no cost other
than the users’ time.
One of the cost categories we created was Reduced "en-
tropy". We are defining this to be a reduction in the number
of guesses an attacker needs to make or a reduction in the
keyspace or entropy (measure of uncertainty) [10][11]. We
are not considering guesswork to be a substitute for entropy
[12] but using the word "entropy" as a general word for
guessability, keyspace and entropy. This is because relying
solely on entropy oversimplifies how passwords withstand
guessing attacks [3]. In many cases, the trade-off between
keyspace/entropy/guessability is not clear and requires more
information for a definitive answer.
We have presented the costs for the four selected categories
in Table IV. Each scheme is rated as either containing the cost
( ) or not (no-circle); if a scheme contains some part of the
cost or some variation of the cost, we use the "Quasi-" prefix
(#) to indicate this. This is inspired by the system created
by Bonneau et al. in their framework for analyzing password
alternatives [13].
V. DISCUSSION
We will discuss some observations that we made for the
chosen subset of advice categories. Depending on the category
we will either discuss each statement in turn or consider
the statements where the advice is unanimous and then the
statements for which the advice is contradictory.
A. Phrases
Advice regarding password phrases was the most commonly
given advice we encountered. This implies that advice is
mostly concerned with making passwords "strong". Yet in
some cases, the strength of a password is irrelevant to defend
users, as with password capture (e.g. phishing, keylogging)
[3]. In fact, Bellovin 2008 [6] claims that the most common
way passwords are compromised is via keylogger attacks.
1) Unanimous: Within the category Phrases there were
no contradictions for the statements: Don’t use patterns,
Take initials of a phrase and Don’t use words. The last is
particularly interesting since from leaked password database
we know users primarily chose word based passwords [14].
Shay et al. find that the "use of dictionary words and names
are still the most common strategies for creating passwords"
[15]. This depicts how ineffective some password advice can
be and is possibly a reflection on the costs appearing to not
outweigh the benefits from a users’ point of view.
2) Contradicting: The statements: Don’t use published
phrases and Substitute symbols for letters had contradictions.
For don’t use published phrases the advice given was:
i "Don’t use song lyrics, quotes or anything else that has
been published."
ii "Do not choose names from popular culture."
iii "Choose a line of a song that other people would not
associate with you."
The last piece of advice directly contradicts the first. This type
of inconsistency in the advice given makes it no surprise that
users seem disinclined to follow security advice [4][16].
The advice statement Substitute symbols for letters is pro-
posed by two sources but is advised against by a third. We
know from Warner [17] that passwords with simple character
substitutions are weak. Yet, 2 of 3 pieces of advice recommend
it. This could stem from the attitude that it is "better than
nothing" and, as we can see from Table IV, the cost to the
user is relatively low.
B. Composition
Composition restrictions are regularly enforced by websites
but the advice relating to this is not consistent from site to
site. It is interesting to note that Herley [1] hypothesizes
that different websites may deliberately have policies which
are restrictive to different degrees. As this can help ensure
that users do not share passwords between sites. Below we
will discuss each of the three statements associated with
composition.
1) Must include special characters: Seven sites instructed
users to include special characters in their passwords, but five
sites placed restrictions on the special characters that could
be used. The main restriction on special characters was "do
not use spaces". However, one piece of advice stated the more
direct "do not use special characters". By not allowing users
to include all special characters an attackers’ search space is
decreased.
2) Don’t repeat characters: Not allowing the repetition
of characters deters users from choosing passwords such as
"aaaaaaa" or "wwddcc". Depending on the strictness of the
restriction it could eliminate words such as "bookkeeper" or
"goddessship". It could also cause some inconvenience for ran-
dom password generators where the word "Sdt2htTtd65c8h"
could be rejected. We list it as incurring the cost reduced
"entropy" since it is banning characters sequences.
3) Enforce restrictions on characters: We collected twelve
pieces of advice encouraging composition restrictions on pass-
words and only one piece of advice against it. The source
rejecting composition rules was the NIST 2016 draft password
guidelines. Though the guidelines are still in the review stage
they are receiving promising responses from the research
community [18]. This raises the question: will organizations
begin to disseminate these new security practices? Or continue
to enforce their stringent password restrictions?
We claim that forcing users to include special characters
quasi-reduces "entropy". If a user creates an eight digit pass-
words with no restrictions each of the eight characters could
be any of the 96 possible ASCII characters. However, by
restricting the password so that it must include one special
character we limit the options for one of the character to the
34 special characters. This becomes more significant when a
site enforces multiple restrictions on composition. In addition,
the probability of a user including a "1" as their number and an
"!" as there symbol is high [19]. So again an attacker can refine
the guesses they make. This idea of composition restrictions
reducing search space is something we will consider further
in future work.
C. Expiry
1) Unanimous: We found five pieces of advice telling
organizations to Store password history to eliminate reuse, one
encouraging organizations to Enforce a minimum password
age and ten in favor of Changing passwords if compromise
is suspected. If organizations do store their users’ password
history this creates an additional security hole as the company
needs to allocate resources to protecting this file. Users can no
longer reuse prior passwords but alterations are still possible
[15]. In fact, Zhang, Monrose and Reiter [20] identify that we
can easily predict new passwords from old when password
aging policies force updates.
Table IV
COSTS OF IMPLEMENTING PASSWORD ADVICE.
Costs
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Phrases
Don’t use patterns. 0 6     #
Take initials of a phrase. 0 4 #  
Don’t use published phrases. 1 2  #  #
Substitute symbols for letters. 1 2   
Don’t use words. 0 16     
Composition
Must include special characters 5 7  # #  
Don’t repeat characters. 0 3  #    
Enforce restrictions on characters. 1 12    #
Expiry
Store history to eliminate reuse. 0 5 #      
Have a minimum Password Age. 0 1 # #
Change your password regularly. 4 7    #  
Change if suspect compromise. 0 10  # #
Reuse
Never reuse a password. *5 6    
Alter and reuse passwords 3 3 #  #
Don’t reuse certain sites’ passwords. 0 5  #
 = requires the cost; #= partially requires the cost; no circle = does not require the cost.
The reason given for introducing a minimum password age
is to prevent users from bypassing the password expiry system
by entering a new password and then changing it right back
to the old one [21]. However, if an attacker gains access to
a users’ account and changes their password the user will be
unable to change it again until the required number of days
have elapsed, or with an administrators’ help.
Ten pieces of advice recommended changing passwords if
a compromise is suspected. This can be inconvenient for users
not affected by the compromise, and also those that are. If
there is a breach at the server the users were not at fault, yet
still they must choose a new password.
2) Contradicting: From anecdotal evidence we know the
advice change your password regularly is widely hated by
users [22]. Referring to the costs in Table IV, we note that the
costs associated with other advice are one-time occurrences.
By contrast, when password expiry is enforced users face
many of the costs periodically. Seven pieces of the advice
we collected encouraged the use of password expiry while
only four pieces of advice discouraged it. This is despite
research suggesting that the security benefits are minimal
[23][20]. This implies the inconvenience to users is worth
less to organizations than the minimal security benefits. Or do
organizations want to be seen to be enforcing strong security
practices, and forcing expiry is just one way of doing this?
D. Reuse
We collected six pieces of advice telling users to never reuse
passwords and three pieces telling users to not reuse passwords
for certain sites. In addition, we found three pieces of advice
encouraging users to alter and reuse their passwords and three
pieces telling users to not alter and reuse their passwords.
There seems to be little agreement among the distributed
advice in terms of password reuse.
1) Never reuse a password vs. reuse for certain accounts:
Das et al. estimate that 43-51% of users re-use passwords
across sites [24]. They also provide algorithms that improve
an attacker’s ability to exploit this fact. Florêncio, Herley and
Van Oorschot [5] declare that, far from being unallowable,
password reuse is a necessary and sensible tool for managing a
portfolio of passwords. They recommend grouping passwords
according to their importance and reusing passwords only
within those groups. Interestingly, the advice we collected
Don’t reuse certain passwords gave a slightly different take
on this advice. The advice mostly asked users to not use the
password used for their site anywhere else e.g. "Never use
your Apple ID password for other online accounts". Most
organizations gave advice prioritizing their own accounts.
Only one piece of advice suggested using a unique password
for any important accounts [25].
2) Alter and reuse passwords: An alternative to grouping
accounts for reuse is to alter and then reuse a password.
This advice was given by three sources and rejected by three
sources. These alterations are sometimes very predictable.
Using a cross-site password guessing algorithm Das et al. were
able to guess approximately 10% of non-identical password
pairs in less than 10 attempts and approximately 30% in less
than 100 attempts. We could find no research identifying this
method of altering and reusing passwords as effective. We
consider altering and reusing passwords to quasi-increase the
risk of forgetting, impossible to enforce and quasi-creates an
additional security hole.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we highlighted characteristics of the password
advice currently available online. We show that there are
serious discrepancies in the advice given between sources. We
also note that some of the advice viewed by researchers and
specialists as "best practice" is often not represented by the
majority of advice. This contradictory information may reflect
one of the reasons for users’ unwillingness to follow advice.
We then looked at costs that could be associated with the
enforcement of different pieces of password advice. Our aim
here was to introduce the idea of a framework for deducing
costs associated with implementing password advice. The
costs model also provides some rudimentary insight into the
biases of password advice.
Our collection and categorization of advice and identi-
fication of costs brought discrepancies in password advice
into focus, in addition it highlighted the following interesting
characteristics:
Research has shown that substituting symbols for letters is
a weak security practice. But two of three pieces of advice
recommend it.
Most of the advice we collected was concerned with mak-
ing passwords strong. Yet, password strength cannot protect
against password capturing malware, social engineering, or
physical observation.
Of the 13 pieces of advice relating to password composition
only the NIST 2016 draft guidelines spoke against restrictions.
Sixteen pieces of advice recommended that words not be
included in passwords but we know from leaked password
databases that users primarily choose word based passwords.
Seven pieces of the advice we collected encouraged the
use of expiration policies while four discouraged it. The costs
associated with expiry imply that the inconvenience to users is
worth less to an organization that the minimal security benefits.
Similarly, most organizations gave advice encouraging the
prioritization of passwords associated with their own accounts
rather than encouraging realistic and user-focused security
practices.
In terms of future work, our next step is to develop methods
to quantify each of the costs we have identified in this paper.
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